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 Abstract 
This paper applies the methodology developed by Forte and Peña (2006) to extract the 
implied default point in the premium on credit default swaps (CDS). As well as considering 
a more extensive international sample of corporations (96 US, European and Japanese 
companies) and a longer time interval (2001-2004), we make two significant contributions to 
the original methodology. First, we calibrate bankruptcy costs, allowing for the adjustment 
of the mean recovery rate of each sector to its historical average. Second, and drawing 
on the sample of default point indicators for each company-year obtained, we propose an 
econometric model for these indicators that excludes any reference to the credit derivatives 
market. With this model it is thus possible to estimate the default barrier resorting solely 
to the equity market. Compared with other alternatives for setting the default point in the 
absence of CDS (such as the optimal default point for shareholders, the default point in 
the Moody’s-KMV model or the face value of the debt), the out-of-sample use of the 
econometric model significantly improves the capacity of the structural model proposed 
by Forte and Peña (2006) to differentiate between companies with an investment grade 
rating (CDS less than 150 bp) and those with a non-investment grade rating. 
 
JEL: G13, G33. 
Keywords: credit risk, structural model, credit default swap, implied default barrier. 
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1 Introduction 
A central element in structural credit risk models is the definition of a stochastic process for 
the total value of the company's assets, and the assumption that default arises when its value 
reaches a specific minimal threshold. This threshold is usually referred to as the default barrier 
or the default point1. 
The empirical testing of these models usually involves analysing their capacity 
to generate credit risk premia that are consistent with those observed in other markets such 
as the debt market. Such testing is normally hampered by the fact that a good number of 
the parameters common to most structural models are not directly observable. This is the 
case, for instance, of the volatility of the total value of assets, of the potential costs of 
bankruptcy, and of the default point2. As a result, researchers need to define a procedure 
for estimating the parameters, which ultimately means testing turns into a simultaneous test 
on the model and on the estimation procedure. 
In a recent paper, Forte and Peña (2006) (FP hereafter) propose a structural 
model consisting of a modified version of the well-known model of Leland and Toft (1996). 
One distinguishing aspect of the FP paper is that, along with the model, it proposes a 
specific procedure for determining the parameters. The methodology proposed (theoretical 
model and estimation procedure) has two fundamental characteristics. Firstly, it considers 
that bankruptcy costs may be assumed to be equal to zero when valuing the company's total 
assets, although such costs are clearly relevant with a view to valuing debt. The reason 
lies in the fact that such costs do not affect the total value of the assets, solely the 
percentage of assets that will remain in creditors' hands in the event of bankruptcy. In this 
respect, FP adopt an approach similar to that proposed by Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001). 
The second key aspect is the termination of the default point. FP propose calibrating this 
parameter on the basis of the information available in other markets, particularly in the CDS 
market. This procedure is analogous to determining the volatility of shares on the basis of the 
price of their associated options. 
FP demonstrate that the methodology described allows, for most companies, for the 
generation of credit risk premia drawing on stock market capitalisation and an a small number 
of accounting items, which would be in line with those observed in the bond or CDS markets. 
In this way the authors are able to analyse, on the basis of a uniform measure such as the 
credit risk premium, the different speed with which the three markets (for bonds, CDS and 
equities) incorporate new information in respect of credit risk. FP conclude that the equity 
market leads the other markets when it comes to incorporating this information, with no clear 
pattern of leadership between the bond and CDS markets. 
One limitation of the procedure proposed by FP is that it is not applicable to 
companies without CDS or reasonably liquid bonds, and it is precisely in these cases 
when the information that can be generated from the equity market will prove more valuable. 
                                                                          
1. The possibility of default is restricted on occasions to specific periods. In the seminal paper by Merton (1974), 
for example, default can only take place on maturity of the debt. It is moreover habitual in this type of model to speak 
interchangeably about default and bankruptcy, although both events need not be associated. This interchangeability 
will also be applicable in this paper. 
2. Although the default point is not observable, many models provide a guide to determine it. This is the case, 
for instance, of models with an endogenous default point. 
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In this paper we analyse the determination of the default point when the only market 
information available is that provided by the equity market. To do this we consider a 
broader international sample of companies than in FP (96 US, European and Japanese 
companies), and one which spans a longer period (2001-2004). We apply the methodology 
described to the sample with a view to obtaining the default point indicator (the ratio between 
the default barrier and the face value of the total debt) for each company-year observation. 
One fundamental contribution compared with the paper by FP is that instead of considering 
exogenous bankruptcy costs like these authors, such costs are calibrated on the basis of 
the sector in question. The aim is that once the process to estimate the default point 
indicators is over, not only will the premia observed in the CDS market be replicated, but an 
expected recovery rate will be obtained for each sector adjusted to the historical evidence. 
The main conclusion from applying this procedure is that the bankruptcy costs would 
on average be around 60% of the value of the company's assets, far above what is 
traditionally assumed by the literature3. In the wake of these results, these costs should 
be broadly interpreted and include, in addition to legal costs, the loss of future income 
incurred by the company owing to the potential discontinuation of operations. 
Based on the series of premia in the equity market and in the CDS market, 
we perform an analysis of price discovery to provide further evidence on this process. 
In line with the results obtained by FP, we find that the equity market leads the CDS market in 
the incorporation of new information on credit risk. This conclusion is valid for all the periods 
(2001, …, 2004) and economic areas (United States, the euro area and Japan) considered. 
Hereafter, and drawing on the sample obtained of default point indicators further 
to calibration with the CDS market, an econometric model is developed for these indicators. 
The model is capable of representing up to 84% of the variability in the default point 
indicator using a very small number of explanatory variables. Any reference to the CDS 
market is excluded from these variables, and the model is thus susceptible to being applied 
to companies for which data on this market are not available. 
For the following step we estimate the default point indicator for each company-year 
of the sample based on the econometric model, and we re-calculate the equity market 
premia series using these new indicators. We find that although the estimator of the default 
point indicator is unbiased outside the sample (it leads on average to the same value 
suggested by the CDS), the high sensitivity of the estimated premium in respect of this 
parameter may cause significant deviations from the premium observed in the CDS market, 
especially when what is obtained is an overestimation of the default point. Using the model, 
however, allows companies to be classified in different levels of credit risk with greater 
accuracy than with other procedures. This is the case, for instance, when what is sought is 
a distinction between companies with an investment grade rating and companies with a 
non-investment grade rating. Specifically, given the null hypothesis that a company's CDS is 
below 150 bp for a specific date (which is equivalent to showing an investment grade rating), 
the use of the indicators generated by the econometric model is, among all the possible 
alternatives to direct calibration with CDS, the procedure which, maintaining the level of 
significance below 10%, offers most testing power (69% compared with 30% for the best 
alternative consisting of use of the theoretical optimal point). 
                                                                          
3. Both Forte and Peña (2006) and Leland (2004) assume a value of 30%. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0639 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the FP methodology. 
Section 3 analyses the sample of companies and implementation of the procedure 
described in Section 2. Section 4 studies the process of price discovery. Section 5 develops 
the econometric model, while Section 7 tests its usefulness with a view to a potential 
out-of-sample application. Finally, Section 8 draws the main conclusions. 
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2 The Forte and Peña (2006) Methodology 
The FP methodology is essentially a modification of the Leland and Toft (1996) model, 
as well as a procedure for estimating the default barrier based on information on the credit 
risk premium in markets other than the equity market, and in particular in the CDS market. 
The original Leland and Toft (1996) model has as its premise that the total value of 
the company’s assets, V, moves according to the following continuous diffusion process 
( ) VdzVdtdV σδµ +−=  (1) 
where µ  and σ  represent the expected return of V and its volatility, respectively, δ  the 
proportion of the total value of the assets set aside for payment to investors (interest and 
dividends), and z describes a standard Brownian process. Under these assumptions, Leland 
and Toft (1996) show that the value at any point in time t of a bond with a maturity τ , 
principal ( )τp , coupon ( )τc , and whose holder receives a fraction ( )τρ  of the value of the 
assets in the event of default, will be given by the following expression 
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On the basis of equation (2), FP suggest expressing the default point BV  as a 
fraction β  of the face value of the total debt P. Assuming then that each creditor receives, in 
the event of default, a fraction of that value (net of bankruptcy costs) proportionate to the 
weight of the face value of their debt relative to the total debt, that gives the following 
alternative expression for the value of the bond4 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )τττβατττττ τ G
r
cpF
r
cpe
r
ctVd r ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+= − 11,,
 (3) 
where [ ]0,1α ∈  represents the bankruptcy costs. 
The total value of the debt, ( )t,VD , will be the sum of the value of all 
individual bonds. If we assume N bonds have been issued, and if we denote the face value 
of the ith bond as iτ , then 
( ) ( )∑
=
=
N
i
i tVdtVD
1
,,, τ
 (4) 
Another fundamental equation in the FP methodology is that which relates the value 
of own capital, ( )t,VS , to the value of the firm’s total assets 
( ) ( ) ( )0|,, =−= αtVDtVtVS  (5) 
where ( )0=α|t,VD  represents the value of the debt under the assumption that the 
bankruptcy costs are equal to zero. The intuition whereby α  does not form part of 
the equation defining ( )t,VS , although it does affect the valuation of the debt in keeping with 
expressions (3) and (4), is based on the fact that the shareholders will not be directly affected 
by the firm's loss of value in the event of bankruptcy, since the creditors are the only parties 
that bear this cost5. 
2.1 Calibration procedure 
The credit risk premium provided by the structural model at each point in time t is determined 
as the theoretical premium of issuing a bond at par with a maturity equal to that of the CDS 
that are to be used subsequently for the calibration of β , and which we will assume to be 
equal to 5 years. Specifically, this bond should pay a coupon such that the following condition 
holds 
( ) pptVd =,5,
 (6a) 
If we denote this coupon as ( )5,tc p , the bond yield will be  
( ) ( )
p
pcy tEt
,5
5 =
 (6b) 
                                                                          
4. See also Leland (2004). 
5. For a discussion of this point see Forte and Peña (2006). 
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whereupon the premium obtained on the basis of the structural model will respond to the 
differential between this yield and the risk-free rate  
( ) ryICS Ett −= 5  (6c) 
To apply this procedure it is necessary to have at each point in time t information on: 
I.1. Value of the company tV . 
I.2. Face value of total debt tP . 
I.3. Risk-free rate tr . 
I.4. Payout tδ . 
I.5. Volatility tσ . 
I.6. Bankruptcy costs tα . 
I.7. Default point indicator tβ . 
 
FP propose considering volatility, bankruptcy costs and the default point indicator as 
constant, and allowing the rest of the variables to depend on t. In order to determine these 
variables, the following data will firstly be collected: 
D1. Daily data on stock market capitalisation. 
As we will see below, the estimation of the total value of the assets based on stock market 
capitalisation in keeping with expression (5), is the key factor that allows the information 
provided by the equity market in terms of credit risk premia to be translated. 
D2. Accounting data referring to 
D.2.1. Short-term liabilities (STL). 
D.2.1. Long-term liabilities (LTL). 
D.2.3. Interest payments (IE). 
D.2.4. Dividend payments (CD). 
 
These accounting data will typically be available quarterly, half-yearly or annually, 
whereby some type of interpolation is proposed in order to translate them into daily data. 
Total liabilities (TL) will be the sum of short- and long-term liabilities. That gives 
TtTLP tt ...,,1; ==  (7) 
The payout tδ  shall be expressed as 
Tt
V
IECD
t
tt
t ...,,1; =+=δ
 (8) 
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Having thus assumed a value for β , the series of the total value of the assets tV  can 
be estimated, as can volatility σ , by means of the following algorithm 
1) Proposing an initial value for σ , 0σ . 
2) Taking as a basis the observed stock market capitalisation series, St, estimating the 
series Vt  so that the relationship expressed in (5) holds for all t. 
3) Estimating the volatility of tV , 1σ , on the basis of the series obtained in 2). 
4) Concluding whether 01 σσ = . Otherwise proposing 1σ  in step 1 and repeating until 
convergence. 
However, this procedure calls for the total value of the debt to be determined when 
bankruptcy costs are zero, ( )0=α|t,VD . On the basis of equation (4), and imposing 0=α , 
it is possible to express this value as the sum of individual bonds. It therefore becomes 
necessary to interpret the information available on the debt (short- and long-term 
liabilities, and interest payments) in the form of such bonds. FP suggest considering that the 
company maintains a total of ten; one with the face value of the short-term debt and with a 
maturity equal to one year, and nine with a maturity of 2 to 10 years respectively, and a face 
value for each one equal to 1/9 of the long-term debt. Furthermore, a coupon is assigned 
to each of these 10 bonds, representing a fraction of the annual payment of interests 
proportionate to the weight of the face value of the bond relative to the face value of the 
total debt. 
The risk-free interest rate to be applied to each of these bonds will be the swap rate 
corresponding to their maturity. The following information will thus have to be reflected: 
D.3. Daily data on the 1-10 year swap rate, i.e. ( ) 101 ...,,;r st =ττ . 
which at the same time provides the rate to be applied in (5) 
( ) Ttrr stt ...,,1;5 ==  (9) 
Regarding the bankruptcy costs, FP propose following previous papers [Leland 
(2004)] using a fixed value for all the companies, specifically 
3.0=α  (10) 
whereby the sole parameter to be determined is β . 
The following relationship between the series ICS and CDS is then assumed 
teCDSICS tt
ε×=
 (11) 
where the tε  are errors i.i.d. with [ ] 0=tE ε  y ( ) εσε =tVar . Under these conditions the Mean 
Squared Error is 
2
1
log1 ∑
= ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
T
t t
t
CDS
ICS
T
MSE
 (12) 
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and β  is finally determined as that value of the default point indicator which minimises this 
measure of discrepancy between series, i.e. 
 ( )MSE
β
β argmin≡
 (13) 
In sum, the implied credit risk premium in the equity market is constructed on the 
basis of (6). The necessary arguments, detailed in I.1.–I.7., are estimated using the data 
described in D.1.–D.3. and equations (6)–(13). 
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3 Data and Implementation 
A. Data 
The initial sample contains daily data on five-year CDS for 120 non-financial corporations in 
the United States (dollar-denominated CDS), Europe (belonging to the euro area and with 
euro-denominated CDS) and Japan (yen-denominated CDS). The data have been taken from 
CreditTrade, and are confined to the period from 2 January 2001 to 31 December 2004. 
For the equity market, daily data on stock market capitalisation are obtained from 
Datastream. Taken from this database, also with a daily frequency, is the 1-10 year swap rate 
in dollars, euro and yen. The accounting items required by the FP methodology (short- and 
long-term liabilities, along with interest and dividend payments) are obtained from 
WorldScope. 
B. Implementation 
The general procedure described in Section 2 is specified in our case as follows: 
1.  The accounting data at each point in time t are determined by linear interpolation among 
the annual data obtained drawing on WorldScope. 
2.  The sample is divided into calendar years, so that the β  are adjusted by year (unlike FP, 
which adjust them by half-year). No company-year observation is considered unless at 
least 150 observations of CDS for that year are available, and no company remains in the 
sample if it is not possible to consider at least 2 consecutive years. 
A total of 7 companies are eliminated in accordance with the restrictions imposed in 
point 2, either because of a lack of sufficient data on CDS or because of the absence of the 
related data for the equity market. 
FP indicate moreover that it is not advisable to apply their methodology 
to companies involved in mergers or acquisitions, and they analyse the specific example 
of the merger of Olivetti and Telecom Italia. The reason is that as the merger or acquisition 
draws near, the credit premiums for these companies will tend increasingly to represent the 
credit risk of the joint company, with the information on one of the companies involved 
proving insufficient in this case6. The following point of the implementation is intended to 
eliminate those companies subject to merger or acquisition processes that may have a 
significant bearing on results: 
3.  For each company a study is made of whether, during the sample period, merger or 
acquisition operations are under way7. If they are, the company is eliminated if such an 
operation entails an amount higher than 5% of the total value of its assets, and if it gives rise 
to a change in its capitalisation of more than 10%. 
                                                                          
6. The development of an adjustment allowing this methodology to be used on the consolidated theoretical company is, 
moreover, beyond the objectives of this study. 
7. To identify merger and acquisition operations we have used the SDC Platinum database, which was made available to 
us thanks to Ricardo Gimeno. 
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This procedure involves eliminating another 6 companies from the sample8. 
4.  For the companies that remain in the sample after step 3, an initial estimation (E1A) is 
made assuming a constant β  for each company throughout the period, 0401−β . 
FP indicate that on this point it is possible to obtain two solutions: one with a "small" 
β  and one with a "large" β . They justify the first solution as being more reasonable, since 
the second one means values of β  typically above 1, which does not generally appear 
rational from the standpoint of the shareholders9. To ensure that the first solution is obtained, 
and adhering once again to FP, the following procedure is applied: 
a)  Choose an initial, sufficiently small value for 0401−β , 0β  (specifically 0.3), and 
define 05001 .+= ββ . 
b)  Evaluate )(MSEMSE 00 β=  and )(MSEMSE 11 β= . 
c)  If 01 MSEMSE < , define 0β  once again as 10 ββ =  and return to step a). 
d)  If 01 MSEMSE ≥ , seek the value of β  that minimises the MSE in the interval 
).,.( 050050 00 +− ββ . 
If the corner solution 300401 .=−β  is obtained, the procedure is repeated, reducing the 
initial value of 0β . 
As in FP, each new proposal for β  entails a new estimation of volatility in 
accordance with the algorithm described in Section 2. In this connection, all the accounting 
and capitalisation data available are used (from 2 January 2001 to 31 December 2004). 
5.  Taking 0401−β  of the initial proposal for each company, a new estimation (E1B) is made in 
which β  is allowed to vary from year to year. This gives rise to a vector { }04030201 βββββ ,,,s =  
for each company. 
Each proposal for a new vector entails a new estimate of volatility, where in this case 
the links between years are omitted so that the changes in β  do not affect the findings. 
In those cases in which there are not sufficient CDS data for a year, the value of β  closest in 
time is applied when estimating this volatility. 
At this point it is worth referring to the choice of bankruptcy costs, α , and their 
consequences for the estimation of β . The parameter β  determines the default point, and 
therefore the probability of default for a specific time horizon, both the actual probability 
and the risk-neutral probability. But this parameter also determines, along with α , the rate of 
recovery in the event of default ( )1 α β− . Just as Leland (2004) justifies the fact that different 
values of α  and β  can replicate a single recovery rate (RR), but only one of these pairs of 
values is capable of replicating moreover a specific (real) probability of default, we have it in 
our case that the values of α  and β  capable of replicating a specific RR are infinite, but only 
                                                                          
8. We should acknowledge that such a procedure does not prevent the possibility of certain companies affected 
by mergers or acquisitions from continuing in the sample, owing to the fact that completion of the operation may 
have come about subsequently to our sample period. Foreseeably, however, such a possibility will not significantly 
influence the results. 
9. We may add that it is not consistent either with the empirical evidence on recovery rates. 
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one of those pairs allows, moreover, a specific credit risk premium to be replicated. Indeed, 
this premium depends on the RR and on the (risk-neutral) probability of default. Having set an 
objective RR drawing on the empirical evidence, there will only be one pair of values for α  
and β  that additionally allow the CDS and ICS  series to be adjusted. 
Assuming β  equal to 0.731, Leland (2004) manages to replicate the expected 
default frequencies (EDF) of different credit ratings. This, combined with bankruptcy costs 
of 30%, enables an RR of around 51% to be reproduced at the same time. FP likewise 
assume bankruptcy costs of 30%. For their sample, the calibration of β  gives rise to an 
average value of 0.792, and therefore to an average RR of 55%. Significantly, both 
papers arrive at very similar estimated values departing from different approaches. One seeks 
to replicate EDF and the other premiums in the CDS market. Both Leland (2004) and FP 
consider that an RR slightly higher than 50% is reasonable given the historical evidence. 
An RR of around 50% need not, however, be the most appropriate reference 
value for any sector or any period. Table I includes the average RR for defaults observed 
by sector in Varma, Cantor and Hamilton [Moody’s Special Comment (2003)], and for the 
period 1982-2003. What is primarily striking is the dispersion by sector, ranging from 23.2% 
in telecoms to 51.5% in the utility-gas sector. Secondly, the total average is 35.4%, far down 
on the figure of 50% or 55% that is usually considered representative. This reduction can be 
explained by the inclusion of recent years in which the average RR has been particularly low 
(25.6% in 2000 according to the same paper). Table I indicates, moreover, the sectors in 
which the RR has not been statistically different from the average, and those in which it has 
been statistically higher or lower than that average. 
Different RR depending on the sector involved may undoubtedly be due to different 
average values for the β . However, it is reasonable to expect that bankruptcy costs will vary 
too depending on the sector. Habitually, these costs are identified with the direct charges 
associated with the legal resolution of a default, and where appropriate with settlement, 
whereby it is reasonable to assume that they depend especially on the legal framework 
established by the country in which the conflict is resolved, and to a lesser extent on 
the sector. Nonetheless, these legal costs appear to represent a small proportion of the 
company's loss of value in the event of bankruptcy [between 4% and 8% for developed 
economies according to the Global Financial Stability Report of the International Monetary 
Fund (2004)]. The higher percentage of these costs might therefore be associated with 
the loss due to transfer of future income, such transfers being made more or less free of 
charge by the company to other firms in its sector, on deciding to discontinue operations. 
In the case of companies whose activity is linked to specific tangible assets, as is the case 
with gas corporations, this free transfer will be minor, as any company wishing to take up 
the market share freed up by a bankrupt company will possibly have to purchase from that 
company a portion of its tangible assets. In the case of other types of sectors whose activity 
is linked to a lesser extent to specific assets, as is the case with telecoms, the transfer of 
income will be sizeable, since the companies in this sector may assume the market share 
freed up without compensating in any way the bankrupt company. 
It thus seems reasonable to introduce sectoral variability into the bankruptcy costs. 
To this end, the β  estimation procedure in respect of that proposed by FP is extended as 
follows: 
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6.  Those companies with an MSE higher than one after the EIB estimation are eliminated 
from the sample. The remaining companies are grouped according to the sectoral 
classification of Table I10. Taking as a reference the value of 0401−β  obtained for each company 
in the EIA estimation, the average RR for the sector, given the assumed value for the 
bankruptcy costs ( 30.=α ), is calculated. 
FP offer examples to argue that an "abnormally high" MSE may be indicative of the 
presence in the CDS of information other than the credit risk associated with the company's 
financial position. It is important to strip out these companies before calculating the 
average RR by sector owing to the potential bias that they might add to these averages. 
Up to 11 companies are eliminated for this reason. 
7.  In the light of the results of point 6, a selection is made in each sector of a representative 
firm as far as the RR is concerned, namely the firm whose RR is closest to the average 
obtained for its sector following the EIA estimation. The specification is then made of 
the bankruptcy costs it is necessary to assume so that the company, once a fresh estimation 
of 0401−β has been made, may generate an RR equal to the historical average for its sector. 
The use of a representative company allows, for each possible value of α , 0401−β  to 
be re-estimated for a single company by sector. The alternative would be to make a 
re-estimation of 0401−β  for all the companies in each sector and to calculate in each case 
the new average, which would be very costly in computational terms. As we shall see, the 
proposed procedure suffices to give a reasonable approximation to the bankruptcy costs in 
terms of the sector. 
8.  The bankruptcy costs obtained in point 7 are imposed below on the rest of the companies 
depending on the sector, and points 4 and 5 are repeated, i.e. a new estimation is made 
assuming a constant β  (E2A), along with a subsequent estimate allowing it to vary from year 
to year (E2B). 
The results of steps 6 to 8 are shown in Table II. Panel A reflects the results of 
assuming bankruptcy costs of 30% for all companies. Evidently, this leads to the systematic 
overestimation of the RR for all sectors, which would appear to indicate that such costs 
will be higher in all cases than the assumed figure of 30%. This is duly indicated by the 
results of steps 7 and 8 contained in panel B. The panel reflects how the method applied 
enables an RR by sector consistent with the empirical evidence to be generated, albeit at 
the expense of assuming bankruptcy costs far above those traditionally accepted by 
the literature11. The most evident case in this respect is that of the telecoms sector, with 
estimated bankruptcy costs of 69%. It is however difficult to reconcile bankruptcy costs of 
between 10% and 20% [as estimated by Andrade and Kaplan (1998)], or even of 30% 
[as assumed by Leland (2004) and FP], with a loss given default (LDP) of 77% (alternatively, 
an RR of 23%). Bankruptcy costs of 30% would be consistent with an RR of 23% if a value 
for β  equal to 0.33 were assumed, i.e. if telecoms were capable on average of withstanding 
the total value of their assets being equal to 33% of the face value of their debt, without 
defaulting on the payment of such debt. The average value of β  obtained for these 
companies is, however, 0.74. Continuing with the previous arguments, we have it that 
both the combination ( 30.=α ; 330.=β ) and the combination resulting from the estimation 
                                                                          
10. Our classification matches the FTSE/JSE Global Classification System. With these groupings, therefore, we consider 
an equivalence between the ten sectors of this classification and those included in Table I. 
11. In all cases the MSE remains below 1 after the E2B estimate. 
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E2A ( 690.=α ; 740.=β ) allow an envisaged average RR for this sector of close to 23%, but 
only the second combination gives rise, moreover, to credit risk premiums for the equity 
market consistent with those observed in the CDS market. 
C. The Final Sample 
As a result of the procedure described, the following data are obtained for a final sample of 
96 companies: 
a)  Daily series of credit risk premia drawn from the CDS market (CDS). 
b)  Default point indicators in annual terms further to calibration with the CDS 
market ( CDSβ ). 
c)  Daily series of credit risk premia drawn from the equity market further to 
calibration with the CDS market ( CDSICS ). 
Table III offers some descriptive statistics of these companies' CDS. As might be 
expected, an inverse relationship with the company's rating is observed. These premiums are 
also seen to be on a declining trend throughout the period 2002–2004 (the number of 
companies with data for 2001 is relatively insignificant). Across the economic areas, the 
United States shows the highest average levels, followed by the euro area and finally 
by Japan. 
Table IV contains the various measures of the differential between the ICS and CDS 
series habitually used in the literature. This differential is shown to be greater in absolute-value 
terms (avab) the worse the rating is, but highly stable in relative terms [avab(%)]. Both 
results would be consistent with a log-linear relationship between the series in keeping 
with expression (11). The inverse relationship between credit rating and differential in 
absolute-value terms may moreover explain very well the results in terms of years and 
economic areas. Thus, the improvement in credit rating in our sample during the period 
2002-2004 (represented by the decline in CDS) was accompanied by a reduction in this 
differential. Likewise, we find that the United States, the area with the biggest levels of CDS, 
is also the region with the biggest differentials in absolute terms. At the other extreme 
would be Japan, with the lowest levels of CDS and the lowest differentials. Generally, 
the discrepancy between series appears in our case greater than that obtained by FP 
(28.66% on average in relative terms for the entire sample, compared with 18.79% in the 
aforementioned study). It should however be recalled that, in their study, FP adjust 
the value of β  on a half-yearly basis, while in our case this adjustment is made on a 
yearly basis. Evidently, the greater the frequency with which β  is estimated, the better the 
adjustment will be. 
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of the CDSβ  (company-year observations), and the main 
descriptive statistics. The results range from a minimum of 0.18 to a maximum of 1.22, while 
the mean and median are around 0.85, slightly above the FP figure of 0.792. With a standard 
deviation of 0.15 and a mean of 0.85, the value of CDSβ  stands "typically" between 0.7 and 1. 
For a non-negligible number of companies/year, the default point indicator is higher than 
one, something which FP indicate is not in principle rational from the standpoint of the 
shareholders. These authors consider that a CDSβ  higher than 1 may be indicative of the fact 
that the CDS used in the calibration contain components such as cheapest-to-deliver 
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options. Indeed, if the CDS represent an upwardly biased estimate of the credit risk premium 
in this market, that will translate into a likewise upwardly biased CDSβ . Possibly, however, 
a CDSβ  higher than 1 is reflecting the presence of factors external to the will of the 
shareholders when determining the default point (as would be the case of potential liquidity 
problems). In this respect, the results are consistent with other papers. Davydenko (2005) 
finds, for example, that for 90% of the companies in default in his sample, the ratio of the 
market value of the assets to the book value of debt is in the interval (0.27,1.23), very much in 
line with the content of Fig. 1. 
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4 Price Discovery 
In their study, FP evaluate the different speed with which the bond market, the CDS market 
and the equity market incorporate fresh information on credit risk. One fundamental 
conclusion of this paper is that the equity market leads in this respect the CDS (and bond) 
markets. Although a price discovery analysis of this type is not among the central objectives 
of this study, the availability of a bigger set of companies for a longer period, on one hand, 
and the modifications proposed for the estimation of the CDSICS  series, on the other, advise 
ascertaining to what extent the same result holds in our sample12. 
The analysis is made considering the following VAR model on the daily increases in 
credit risk premia in both markets13; 
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where the optimal number of lags is determined following the Schwarz criterion. The Granger 
causality test finally helps identify which market incorporates earliest the fresh information in 
relation to credit risk. The results in Table V confirm the FP conclusion in that the equity 
market leads the CDS market. The table further indicates that this is true for all the periods 
and economic areas considered. 
 
                                                                          
12. Clearly, and compared with the paper by Forte and Peña (2006), our analysis is partly limited by not having 
information on the bond market. It would not seem, however, that this could significantly affect the conclusions on the 
price discovery process between the CDS market and the equity market. 
13. In the case of CDSICS  series, and for the sake of clarity, we omit the sub-index CDS. 
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5 An Econometric Model for β  
Once we have a sample of values for the default point indicator, ( )T,iCDSβ , where i = 1, …, 96 
denotes the company, and T = 1, 2, 3, 4 the year, we can consider an econometric model in 
which the variable to be explained is ( )T,iL CDSβ  [logarithm of ( )T,iCDSβ ], and where the set of 
explanatory variables excludes any reference to the CDS market. The fundamental aim is to 
analyse the possible application of this model for determining the default point in the case of 
companies without information on CDS. The explanatory variables considered are as 
follows14: 
a)  ( )iENDσ : In their study, FP find that volatility is a key factor when explaining 
differences in the default point between companies (up to 85% of the variability of CDSβ  when 
this parameter is assumed constant for each company). Greater volatility would specifically 
mean a lower β , something habitually forecast by the structural models with an endogenous 
default barrier. One fundamental problem when using this variable as a regressor is that, 
to date, the volatility available to us is that which arises from the process of calibration of the 
( )T,iCDSβ , ( )iCDSσ . Since we seek to omit any reference to the CDS market, we should 
consider an alternative measure of volatility for each company. 
One option is to estimate ( )iσ  applying the algorithm described in Section 3, but 
setting the value of β  irrespective of the data on CDS. Specifically, we can estimate the 
volatility that would arise from assuming that at each point in time t the shareholders 
choose the value of β  optimally. We shall denote this value as ( )t,iENDβ , where the term t 
instead of T indicates that ENDβ  will take daily values instead of annual ones. The Appendix 
demonstrates how this optimal default point indicator for shareholders will be given for each t 
by the following expression: 
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 (13) 
Note that ( )t,iENDβ  is in turn a function of volatility, whereby each proposed new 
value for ( )iENDσ  in accordance with the aforementioned algorithm entails the re-estimation of 
each ( )t,iENDβ . 
After estimating ( )iENDσ  for i = 1, …, 96, we see that the correlation with the ( )iCDSσ  
is 99.98%, i.e. the results in both cases are virtually identical. This indicates that the 
algorithm proposed generates robust estimators of the volatility in respect of the value 
assumed for the default point indicator15. We therefore conclude that it is reasonable to 
use ( )iENDσ  as a measure of the volatility of the total value of the assets. In line with the theory 
and with the results obtained by FP, we would expect to find an inverse relationship between 
volatility and CDSβ . 
                                                                          
14. The data additional to those already available have been taken from WorldScope. 
15. The same conclusions are drawn when making alternative estimates (not provided) of the volatility under other 
assumptions on the value of β .This is the case, for instance, of a fixed value of 0.75. 
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b)  ( )T,ir : as a measure of the risk-free rate we will use the year-long average of the 
swap rate at 5 years. The effect that this variable may have on the default point is ambiguous. 
On one hand, as the interest rate increases the value of the current debt diminishes, which 
increases the incentives to repay it (lower β ). On the other, if this increase persists, it will in 
the long-term entail a higher financing cost, which may more readily dissuade the company 
from adhering to compliance with its commitments to creditors (higher β ). Situations 
involving higher interest rates may at the same time increases the influence of liquidity 
variables, which tends to complicate even further the prediction on the net effect16. 
c)  Payout(i,T): Defined as interest plus dividends over total assets (book value). 
A bigger payout would indicate greater capacity on the company's part to generate free cash 
flows with which to remunerate investors, and in particular creditors. The bigger the payout, 
therefore, the lower we would expect CDSβ  to be. 
d)  Lever(i,T): Leverage of company i in year T at market values. This will be 
approximated by taking total liabilities over total liabilities plus stock market capitalisation. 
Leverage per se should not prove to be an explanatory variable of β , since the default 
point indicator is in itself a standardised measure, due precisely to the level of debt, of the 
default point. It may however prove to be a good indicator of the presence of relevant 
variables not included in the analysis. Specifically, we might establish that those companies 
that are most leveraged are so precisely because they are better able (for other reasons) 
to withstand lower values for their assets without defaulting on debt payment. Our hypothesis 
will therefore have it that there is an inverse relationship between leverage and CDSβ . 
e)  LM2B(i,T): Logarithm of the market-to-book ratio (total liabilities plus stock market 
capitalisation over total book-value assets). The market-to-book ratio may be considered an 
indicator of the company's opportunities for future growth. In this respect, we would expect 
an inverse relationship between this ratio and CDSβ . 
f)  Size(i,T): Company size measured by the logarithm of total assets in thousands of 
dollars. Size can be relevant for determining β  for several reasons. Firstly, greater size would 
allow the company readier access to sources of financing, which would allow it to meet debt 
commitments and thus put back default. It is the biggest companies, moreover, that will tend 
to show greater diversity in their creditors, and those which therefore bear greater costs in 
the event of a hypothetical debt renegotiation. That would likewise lead the company to 
delay such a process. For both reasons, our expectation would be that the greater the size, 
the smaller CDSβ  would be. 
g)  Quick(i,T): Following Davydenko (2005), we introduce the quick ratio (short-term 
assets over short-term liabilities) as a measure of liquidity. It should be stressed that the 
consideration of liquidity as a determinant of default would strictly require it to be modelled as 
an additional state variable. In line with Davydenko (2005), we should define a structural 
model in which both a decline in the value of the assets to below the default point and a fall in 
the quick ratio to below a certain critical threshold might result in default. As far as this paper 
is concerned, we shall simply introduce this measure of liquidity as one more explanatory 
                                                                          
16. In the case of the regressors c) to g) described below, the value considered is the average of the figure 
considered as at 31 December of year T-1 and the figure as at 31 December of year T. The reason for applying this 
procedure (and which motivates also the definition of the variable ( )T,ir ), is that the ( )T,iCDSβ  represents an 
average value for year T, and it has in fact been estimated drawing on a linear interpolation between the book figures 
at the beginning and end of year T. Except for regressor g), we further consider these variables with a quadratic term 
in order to capture potential non-linearities. 
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variable under the assumption that, all other things being equal, the most liquid 
companies tend to default on the payment of their debt for lower levels of the total value 
of their assets (lower CDSβ ). 
h)  Euro(i): Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company belongs to the 
euro area and 0 otherwise. The aim of including this variable and the following one is to 
study the presence of factors specific to the economic areas considered in determining CDSβ . 
i)  Yen(i): Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company is Japanese and 0 
otherwise. 
j)  ( )T,iL ENDβ : Logarithm of the average of ENDβ  for company i in year T. 
The inclusion of the endogenous default point as an explanatory variable has a dual purpose. 
First, to determine to what extent the values that we obtain for β  further to calibration 
with the CDS market, ( )T,iCDSβ , match those that, theoretically, shareholders would 
optimally choose. Second, to analyse whether the use of this variable adds explanatory 
power to a model where variables such as volatility, risk-free rate and payout, which bear 
on the determination of ENDβ , have already been included under the assumption of a linear or 
quadratic relationship. 
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6 Results 
Table VI shows the correlation between the different variables considered in the analysis, 
including the dependent variable ( )T,iL CDSβ . Table VII gives the results of an initial estimation 
(REG 1) in which volatility is included as the sole explanatory variable. The coefficient is 
negative and significant at 1%. This variable, though not reflecting intra-company variability, 
explains on its own more than 40% of the variability in the logarithm of CDSβ , which confirms 
its importance as a determinant of the default point. 
The following column shows the results of a second estimation (REG 2) which 
includes the other explanatory variables with the sole exception of ENDLβ . In this case, 
volatility retains a negative and highly significant coefficient. The coefficient of the swap rate is 
positive and significant, which may be interpreted as a sign that, given an increase in interest 
rates, the prospect of greater future financing costs bears more on the decision to default on 
debt payments than the loss of value of the current debt. The payout does not prove 
significant either in the linear or the quadratic term. Leverage, for its part, proves significant 
in both cases. The value of the coefficients confirms that the logarithm of CDSβ  would be a 
diminishing function of leverage for whatsoever possible value of this variable. Regarding 
the market-to-book ratio, an inverse relationship generally holds. The significance of the 
quadratic term, however, makes this negative relationship conditional on this ratio taking 
values of less than 1.7, which holds in our sample for around 84% of the observations. 
The size variables are likewise significant. Their coefficients would indicate that, as 
forecast, the greater the size, the lower the CDSβ , although such an inverse relationship 
is conditional upon a total asset value exceeding 2.4 billion dollars. In our case this is 
true for over 99% of the observations. As regards the quick ratio, the coefficient is negative 
and significant in line with the starting hypothesis. The coefficient of the dummy variable 
for the euro area is negative and significant, while the coefficient of the dummy for Japan 
does not prove significant. These findings would be consistent with a value for CDSβ  in the 
case of the euro area of around 9% below the value it would take for a similar company 
in the United States. Finally, mention should be made of the explanatory power of the model, 
since over 83% of the variability in the logarithm of CDSβ  is accounted for by a very small 
number of readily accessible variables. 
The third column of Table VII contains the results of a third regression (REG 3) in 
which the logarithm of the average value for the year of ENDβ  is considered as the only 
explanatory variable. Both the constant and the logarithm of ENDβ  are significant at 1%. 
It is not possible, moreover, to reject the null hypothesis that this latter coefficient is 
equal to 1 (t-statistic equal to -0.5180). The significance of the constant indicates, however, 
that the theoretical optimal default point tends on average to underestimate the true value 
by around 10%. 
The correlation between volatility and ENDLβ  (Table VI) is -0.94, which suggests that 
this variable is the key element in the determination of ENDLβ . If ENDLβ  reflects the influence 
of volatility on the default point indicator better than the linear relationship assumption, and if 
moreover it correctly incorporates the influence of other variables such as the risk-free rate 
or the payout, then the explanatory power of REG 3 should be greater than that of REG 1. 
But this does not appear to be the case. The adjusted R2 falls from 41% to 34% on moving 
from REG 1 to REG 3. 
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The results of the following estimation (REG 4), in which the logarithm of ENDβ  has 
been added as an explanatory variable to the variables included in REG 2, are included in 
the fourth column of Table VII. Despite the high correlation between volatility and ENDLβ , the 
coefficients of both variables are significant and with the expected sign, indicating that 
their individual effects are accurately captured and that there are no relevant problems of 
multicollinearity. The adjusted R2 increases slightly relative to REG 2 (0.5%), which likewise 
supports the idea that both variables contain complementary information on CDSLβ . Also of 
note is the fact that, relative to REG 2, size in its linear term and the quick ratio cease to be 
significant, with the remaining variables retaining their significance. 
The question arises, once the rest of the variables are included, as to whether 
volatility continues to be more significant than ENDβ  for explaining the CDSβ . Column 5 
in Table VII repeats the second regression, but omitting volatility and including ENDLβ . 
The adjusted R2 falls from 83% to 65%, indicating that in this case volatility continues 
to have greater explanatory power than ENDLβ . 
In order to obtain a final model for the estimation of the default point indicator in 
theabsence of information on CDS, we perform a final estimation (REG 6). For this we take 
REG 4 as a basis, and sequentially eliminate those variables that show least significance. 
The process ends when the coefficient of all the variables that remain in the model is 
significant at 10%. One interesting figure is that this process leads the payout coefficient, in 
its quadratic term, to become negative and for the first time significant, which confirms 
the inverse relationship that had been expected. The negative relationship between leverage 
and CDSβ  continues to be confirmed in this regression for any possible value of this variable. 
Regarding the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio, the negative relationship that was 
previously conditional upon a value for this ratio below 1.7 is associated now with a value 
below 1.78, which is observed in our sample for approximately 90% of the observations. 
Finally, the negative effect of size is now verified irrespective of the value this variable takes. 
The final adjusted R2 is around 84%. 
An important consideration is that though we have treated the CDSβ  as a 
cross-section sample, these values represent actually an incomplete panel sample. If there 
are unexplained individual effects in the relationship, then the estimation by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) used so far might prove inappropriate. 
The presence of individual heterogeneity is verified by means of a decomposition of 
the variance of the errors, with the null hypothesis of absence of individual effects being 
rejected at 99% for all the regressions in Table VII. For this reason we repeat the estimates 
in this table, but this time applying a panel regression with random effects through 
feasible generalised least squares (FGLS). The panel analysis with fixed effects is not 
considered since the ultimate objective is to apply the regression to out-of-sample 
companies. The results are in Table VIII. Of note are two essential differences in respect 
of the conclusions of Table VII. The first is that now the ENDβ  appear slightly more 
significant for explaining changes in the CDSβ  than volatility (REG 3 versus REG 1, and REG 5 
versus REG 2). Unlike what happened with the cross-section regressions, this would indicate 
that the effect of volatility on CDSβ  is better reflected through its effect on ENDβ  than through a 
linear relationship. Nonetheless, the coefficients of both variables are once again significant 
and with the expected sign in the overall regression, with the elimination of either of 
them (REG 2 y REG 5) giving rise to a reduction in the adjusted R2. It therefore appears that 
in this case too they offer complementary information on the default point indicator. 
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The second difference is that size ceases to be a significant variable. Regarding the other 
variables that remained in the final regression by OLS, such variables also remain in the panel 
regression with random effects, and with an identical sign. The coefficients of leverage in its 
linear and quadratic term are, as before, consistent with a negative relationship to CDSβ  for 
any possible value of this variable. The negative relationship between the market-to-book ratio 
and CDSβ , and which in the OLS regression was ultimately conditional upon a value for this 
ratio of less than 1.78, now holds for market-to-book ratio values of below 1.95, which in our 
sample holds in approximately 95% of the observations. The adjusted R2 of REG 6 for the 
panel estimation with random effects is 95%. 
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7 Usefulness of the Econometric Model 
A. Out-of-sample estimation of β  
A key question is whether the econometric model obtained is applicable to out-of-sample 
companies, since that would allow the credit risk premium in the equity markets to 
be estimated, even in the absence of information on CDS. In this respect, we should 
ask whether, with a view to an out-of-sample estimation, the panel model with random 
effects —in which part of the individual variability may be explained randomly— is advisable, 
or whether on the contrary the cross-section model is preferable, where it is sought to include 
all the individual heterogeneity via the explanatory variables. 
In order to test which procedure is preferable, we begin with an out-of-sample 
estimates of the ( )T,iβ  based on the cross-section econometric model. To do this 
we randomly divide the sample into six groups with 16 companies each. We then re-estimate 
the REG 6 model, eliminating the companies from the first group, and we apply the results to 
predict the ( )T,iβ  of the companies of the excluded group. Repeating this procedure for 
the other five groups, we finally obtain an out-of-sample estimate of the default point 
indicators for each company-year based on the cross-section econometric model. We denote 
these estimated values as ( )T,iREGβ . An identical procedure is then applied to the panel 
model with random effects (the same 6 groups), giving rise to an alternative estimate of 
the ( )T,iβ , which in this case we denote ( )T,iPANβ . 
Table IX compares the errors of each type of estimate. Evidently, although the 
average estimation error is close to zero for both procedures, the cross-section model proves 
more accurate (lower standard deviation and lower standard deviation in absolute values). 
These results would support the idea that, with a view to an out-of-sample estimate, the 
cross-section model is preferable. 
B. Estimation of ICS without information on CDS 
Once the REGβ  have been estimated, it is possible to deduce the series of credit risk 
premia drawing on the equity market, the result of assuming such values for the default 
point indicator ( REGICS ). The aim would be to test to what extent the out-of-sample use 
of the econometric model produces results consistent with those derived from the use of 
the CDSβ  ( CDSICS ), and therefore whether this model may be useful for estimating credit 
risk premia in the equity market in the case of companies without CDS. At the same time, 
it will be worthwhile studying whether the application of the econometric model is an 
improvement on alternative methods for determining the default point. The first alternative 
will be to consider the series generated from the ENDβ  ( ENDICS ). Second will be the series 
resulting from setting for each t the value of β  in keeping with the procedure followed 
by Moody’s-KMV. Specifically, we shall define KMVβ  as the ratio of short-term liabilities plus 
half of the long-term liabilities over total liabilities (resulting series KMVICS )17. We consider 
below the alternative of setting a constant value for β . In this respect, we shall analyse 
the results of imposing β  equals 0.75 for any period or company. This value, which 
we shall denote 750.β  (series 750.ICS ), would be in line with the average values obtained 
                                                                          
17. See Crouhy et al. (2000). It is worth specifying that this exercise in no case seeks to replicate the type of results 
produced by the Moody’s-KMV methodology. 
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by Leland (2004) and FP. Moreover, we will study the results arising from assuming 
that β  equals 0.85 ( 850.β series 850.ICS ). We hereby seek to test to what extent the variability 
of β  included in REGβ , improves the estimates in respect of assuming a constant value 
equivalent to the average. Finally, we shall impose β  equals 1 ( 001.β series 001.ICS ), which 
is equivalent to assuming that default arises when the value of the assets falls to the face 
value of the debt. 
Table X shows the differentials with respect to the CDS series in terms of the 
procedure selected to set the value of β . The main conclusions would be as follows: 
1. The REGICS  tend to overestimate the CDS (by 41.05% on average) to a greater 
extent than the CDSICS  (7.93%). This is despite the fact that the differential between 
REGβ  and CDSβ  is on average equal to zero. These results stem from the non-linear 
relationship between the premium estimated in the equity market and β . Specifically, an 
overestimation of β  appears to produce a bigger error in absolute values than the error 
generated by an underestimation of β  on the same scale. The presence of positive 
extreme values in the differential between the REGICS  series and the CDS series implies, 
moreover, that the average is of such differences is far above the medians, and that the 
standard deviation is also very high. Thus, for example, the average absolute basis (avab) 
is 57.41 bp, practically double the median of this statistic which is 30.65 bp. The standard 
deviation is, moreover, 110.03 bp. If the three companies with the biggest avab are 
eliminated, the average draws close to the median (39.56 bp) and the standard deviation 
falls to 33.81 bp. 
2. Regarding the ENDβ , the underestimation of the CDSβ  tends to give rise, as expected, to 
an underestimation of the CDS, although the differential is in many cases lower than 
that resulting from use of the REGβ . Thus, for instance, the avab is on average 47.80 bp 
(compared with 57.4 bp previously). If, in contrast, the medians are compared 
instead of the averages so that the extreme values have less weight, the REGICS  slightly 
outperform the ENDICS  as predictors of the CDS. The greater penalisation associated 
with the potential overestimation of β , and which gives rise to extreme errors, would 
once again justify the results. The REGβ  are specifically a better approximation to the 
true value of β ; however, the tendency of the ENDβ  to underestimation enables them 
to avoid extreme errors in the prediction of the CDS, prompting better results on average. 
3. In this same respect, the use of the KMVβ  tends to produce an underestimation of 
the CDS on a similar scale to that generated by the ENDβ . The dispersion of the 
differentials is, however, greater in the first instance. Thus, while the average of the avb 
is around -20 bp for both procedures, the standard deviation for the KMVICS  (93.94 bp) is 
greater than for the ENDICS  (59.69 bp). The average of the ENDβ  is 0.75, similar to that of 
the KMVβ , which is 0.73. The tendency of both procedures to underestimate β  produces 
a negative bias in the estimation of the credit risk premia. The lesser dispersion of the 
differential that arises on using the ENDβ  shows that, despite the error, this procedure 
captures better the variability of β  than KMVβ . 
4. Using a fixed value of 0.75, close to the average of the ENDβ  and of the KMVβ , produces 
an avb which is on average similar to that derived from applying these other 
procedures (around -20 bp). Once again, the greater capacity of the ENDβ  to represent 
the variability of β  confers greater accuracy upon it despite the error (standard deviation 
of 59.69 bp compared with 84.42 bp on applying 750.β ). On comparing the dispersion of 
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the differentials, this constant value appears to produce better results than KMVβ . In other 
words, the definition of the default point as short-term liabilities plus half of the long-term 
liabilities does not provide in this model explanatory power in relation to the variability 
of β , actually worsening the results in respect of the assumption of a constant value 
similar to the average. 
5. Although 0.85 represents the average of the distribution of the CDSβ , setting its value 
generally produces worse results than setting 0.75. Once again, the explanation is to 
be found in the high non-linearity of the relationship between the ICS and β . With 850.β , 
underestimations and overestimations are made practically in equal proportions. 
With 750.β , underestimations are made to a greater extent, giving rise on average to lower 
error. 
6. Considering that the company defaults when the value of its assets falls below the face 
value of the debt ( 001.β ) ultimately means a clear tendency to overestimation of the CDS. 
The high penalisation in terms of error associated with the overestimation β  means that, 
among all the procedures, this is the one which gives the worst results. 
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the econometric model is capable of 
reflecting much of the variability of β  (up to 84% within the sample). The high sensitivity 
of the ICS to the value assumed for β , and the special penalisation associated with an 
error of overestimation of this parameter mean that, although in median terms the REGβ  
produce better results, on average greater errors may be committed than with other 
methods. The prediction of the exact value of the credit risk premium generated from 
the model should thus be viewed with caution, and its use may be more appropriate 
for establishing credit risk ranges than for a strict valuation. This is what Table XI, Panel A 
suggests. This Table shows the distribution of CDS by range of values. It can be seen how, 
among the 62,571 observations, more than 50% are below 50 bp, and practically 80% 
below 100 bp. The Table also indicates the proportion of correctness for each method 
and range. Thus, for example, on 86% of the occasions on which the CDS are in the 
range [0.50], the CDSICS  are also in that range. The use of the REGβ  exceeds any other 
method (excluding CDSβ ) in terms of expected correctness for the range (50.500]. It is 
surpassed, however, by the methods ENDβ  and 750.β  for the range [0.50], and by the 
methods 850.β  and 001.β  for the range >500. 
We thus see how those procedures that tend to underestimate the premiums are 
correct to a greater extent in respect of the range that concentrates a bigger percentage of 
observations. Expressed otherwise, as most of the CDS represent values below 100 bp, the 
procedures that systematically predicted low premiums ( ENDβ and 750.β ) tend to be correct to 
a greater extent than the procedure of applying REGβ , since the latter seeks to distinguish 
between companies with low premiums and companies with high premiums. 
In order to assess more formally the discriminatory capacity of each method, the 
following null hypothesis may be considered: 
( ) 150≤t,iCDS:Ho  (14) 
The value of 150 bp would be in the interval between 87.9 bp and 269.5 bp that 
Houweling and Vorst (2001) find on average for companies rated BBB and BB, respectively. 
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The interpretation of the null hypothesis might thus be that the company retains the 
investment rating according to the CDS market agents. 
Table XI, Panel B, shows the probability of error type I (eI) and error type II (eII) 
in terms of the method applied for determining β . In the case of the direct estimation with 
CDS ( CDSβ ), the probability of eI is 4% and that of eII is 14%. These values rise to 9% and 
31%, respectively, on applying the econometric model ( REGβ ). While the underestimation of 
premiums associated with the use of ENDβ , 750.β  and even KMVβ  holds the probability 
of eI below 5%, the probability of eII is in all cases above 65%, which indicates scant 
testing power. The opposite case would be that of 001.β . On overestimating the premiums, 
the probability of eII falls to 9%, but significance worsens considerably (the probability of eI 
climbs to 42%). Mid-way between the results of applying 750.β  or 001.β  would be the results 
for 850.β , with a level of significance of 12% and a probability of eII of 51%. This is possibly 
the case where the usefulness of REGβ  is most evident, since both types of errors lessen on 
applying a method that takes into account not only the average of β  (0.85), but also the 
variability around that average. In sum, of all the procedures that do not require direct 
observation of the CDS, the use of REGβ  is that which, maintaining a level of significance 
below 10%, entails greater testing power. This power would specifically be twice that 
associated with the best possible alternative ENDβ  (69% as opposed to 35%). 
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8 Conclusions 
In this paper we have considered a broad sample of US, European and Japanese companies 
during the period 2001-2004, calibrating the default barrier for each company-year on the 
basis of their CDS premia. Although the procedure used has broadly been that described by 
Forte and Peña (2006), two fundamental contributions should be highlighted. Firstly, 
we calibrated not only the default point, but also bankruptcy costs (exogenous in the original 
model). To do this we adjusted the mean recovery rate forecast for each sector to its 
historical average. Secondly, we constructed an econometric model which allows the default 
point indicators to be estimated without resorting to information on the CDS market. 
The model, which explains up to 84% of the variability of the default point indicators within the 
sample, uses only information on the equity market and a small number of accounting items. 
The main advantage is thus its potential application to companies for which no data on CDS 
are available. Compared with other alternatives for setting the default point when this 
information cannot be had (the optimal default point for shareholders, the default point in the 
Moody’s-KMV model and various inter-company constant default point options), the use of 
the econometric model significantly enhances the capacity for differentiating between 
companies with an investment grade rating and companies with a non-investment grade 
rating. Specifically, faced with the null hypothesis that a company's CDS is less than 150 bp 
(it has an investment grade rating), the use of the econometric model maximises testing 
power maintaining a level of significance below 10%. This power is of the order of 69%, 
double that of the best possible alternative, consisting of setting the default point to the 
shareholders’ optimal point. 
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APPENDIX 
Endogenous β  
The endogenous default point is determined according to the smooth-pasting condition18: 
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Starting from expression (2) for the value of each bond it is possible to resolve (A.1) 
and obtain the optimal default barrier 
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The constraint 0=α  is assured by setting in turn the following condition on the 
coefficients ( )iτρ  
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which is met imposing 
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For its part, the endogenous default point indicator will be simply 
P
V END,B
END =β
 (A.7) 
                                                                          
18. See Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996). 
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 Figure 1: β CDS
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